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I. INTRODUCTION
In Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill,2 the United States Supreme Court in a
five-to-three decision resolved a split among the Courts of Appeals 3 and held that
federal district courts can remand a removed case containing pendent claims 4 to state
court after concluding that it would be inappropriate to retain jurisdiction.5 The Court
inferred this discretion to remand from the discretion to manage pendent claims
granted the lower federal courts. 6 This freedom allows the courts to administer state
law claims to best serve the "principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine." '7
Justice White's dissenting opinion 8 argued that claims could only be remanded
I. TRENCE, ANDRIA, Act V, Scene 4. Translation: "you are hunting for a knot in a bulrush"-in other words,
looking for a difficulty where none exists.
2. 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988).
3. Some circuits have held that district courts are barred from remanding a properly removed case for reasons not
stated in the removal statute. See, e.g., Cook v. Weber, 698 F.2d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 1983) ("remand of removed cases
must be based on specific statutory authority"); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Seay, 696 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir.
1983) (mandamus relief is proper because the remand order was issued on grounds unauthorized by the removal statute);
Levy v. Weissman, 671 F.2d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 1982) (same holding); Ryan v. State Bd. of Elections, 661 F.2d 1130,
1134 (7th Cir. 1981) (same holding).
Other circuits have held that pendent jurisdiction provides legitimate authority on which to base a decision to remand.
See, e.g., In re Romulus Community Schools, 729 F.2d 431, 440 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding remand when "judicial
economy and the presentation of unresolved issues of state law strongly support[ed] the district court's decision to
remand"); Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 89-90 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1983) (determining that the court in its discretion could
remand a properly removed pendent claim); Hofbauer v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 700 F.2d 1197, 1207 (8th Cir. 1983)
(same holding); Naylor v. Case & McGrath, Inc., 585 F.2d 557, 561-63 (2d Cir. 1978) (when state law is unsettled,
district court should refuse jurisdiction and remand state law claims to state court, even after voluntary dismissal of the
federal claims).
The Fifth Circuit was somewhat confused on the issue prior to Cohill. The court in IMFC Professional Servs. of Fla.,
Inc. v. Latin Am. Home Health, Inc., 676 F.2d 152, 160 (5th Cir. 1982), reversed the course of prior decisions like In
re Greyhound Lines, Inc., 598 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1979), and allowed nonstatutory remand for pendent claims. However,
a later decision, Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 507 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1985), cited Greyhound with
approval.
4. This Comment will use the term "pendent" jurisdiction to encompass both pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
See infra text accompanying notes 31-36.
5. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. at 622. While Cohill dealt with administering pendent claims after the federal law claim was
deleted from the complaint, other possibilities might make it inappropriate for the federal court to hear pendent claims.
See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
Congress expressly accepted the Court's decision in Cohill in the legislative history to the Judicial Improvements and
Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988). See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
While Congress has acquiesced in the availability of remand after the disposition of all federal claims in the case leaves
only pendent claims, it is unclear whether other circumstances making it inappropriate for the federal court to hear the
pendent claims justify the remand of those claims. This Comment contends that whenever it is unacceptable for the federal
court to hear pendent claims, the district court judge should be free to remand them at his discretion.
6. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. at 619.
7. Id. at 622.
8. Id. at 622-26 (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., dissenting).
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for statutory reasons. Because the remand statutes 9 do not apply to pendent claim
remand, the majority granted essentially unlimited power to remand pendent claims.10
This Comment justifies pendent claim remand as an authorized and beneficial
technique for district court judges to dispose of pendent claims. Section A of Part II
presents the procedural history of Cohill and the basic situation in which the option
of remanding pendent claims arises. Section B provides a concise overview of the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine. The discussion in Section A of Part III examines the
remand statutes as possible authority for the district courts to remand pendent claims
following removal. However, Section B determines that statutory authority is not
required. Although the remand statutes do not provide any basis for the power to
remand, Section C concludes that they also do not limit that power. The discussion
in Part IV finds that the pendent jurisdiction doctrine itself justifies the courts' latitude
to remand and discusses two major issues concerning pendent claim remand-time
bars on pendent claims (Section A) and forum manipulation by the plaintiff (Section
B). Part V examines the lack of meaningful distinctions between remand and
dismissal of pendent claims. Conclusions are set forth in Part VI.
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR PENDENT CLAIM REMAND
A. Procedural History of Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
Husband and wife William and Carrie Boyle (plaintiffs) commenced the action
by filing a complaint against his former employer Carnegie-Mellon University and
former supervisor (defendants) in a Pennsylvania state court. Plaintiffs alleged a
federal age discrimination claim" and a number of state law claims 12 as a result of
the husband's discharge by defendants.
9. Two statutes provide for general remand after removal. The first provision states:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone,
is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed
and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982).
Before its modification in 1988, the second remand provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982), stated:
If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction,
.the district court shall remand the case, and may order the payment of just costs. A certified copy of the order
of remand shall be mailed by its clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed
with such case.
As a result of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4670
(1988), § 1447(c) now reads:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after
the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding the case may
require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the
removal. A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The
State court may thereupon proceed with such case.
10. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. at 624 (White, J., dissenting).
11. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1982).
12. Such claims charged defendants with violation of state age discrimination laws, wrongful discharge in tort,
wrongful discharge as breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and misrepresentation.
Cohill, 108 S. Ct. at 616.
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Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania. The removal was based on 28 U.S.C. section 1441(a), which
allows the removal of cases in "which the district courts have original jurisdiction."13
The case fell within the original jurisdiction of the district court because it consisted
of a federal question claim, with the state law claims pendent to this federal law claim.
Six months later, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint
to delete the federal age discrimination claim. The plaintiffs felt that this claim was
not tenable and moved to remand the state claims to state court. 14 They noted that the
amendment would eliminate their sole federal law claim, which had provided the
basis for removal, and contended that remand was appropriate in these
circumstances. 15 The motion to amend was granted and the district court remanded
the pendent claims to the state court. 16
Defendants filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. A divided merits panel granted the petition and held
that the district court could not remand a removed case without specific statutory
authorization.17 The court of appeals granted plaintiffs' petition for rehearing en banc
and vacated the panel opinions and writ of mandamus. 18 Since the court divided
evenly on the question of the district court's authority to remand the pendent claims,
the court denied the application for a writ of mandamus 19 and thus allowed the
remand of plaintiffs' case. The Supreme Court granted defendants' petition for a writ
of certiorari, 20 and affirmed the decision allowing the remand. 21
B. Pendent Jurisdiction Doctrine
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear state law
claims brought jointly with a federal claim in federal court or in a case removed to
federal court, even though the state law claims could not have been brought
separately in federal court because by themselves they do not have an independent
basis of federal jurisdiction. 22 The state law claims must be closely related to the
action which is within the court's statutory jurisdiction. In United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs,23 the Supreme Court fashioned a two-prong test for pendent jurisdiction. First,
"power" exists to hear the state claim brought with the federal claim if both claims
derive from a "common nucleus of operative fact" and the claims are such that
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982).
14. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. at 616.
15. Id.
16. Boyle v. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 648 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
17. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1046, 1051 (3d Cir. 1986).
18. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1888 (3d Cir. 1986).
19. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, No. 85-3619, slip op. (3d Cir. Nov. 24, 1986) (en banc).
20. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 107 S. Ct. 1283 (1987).
21. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988).
22. See Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987 DUKE L.J. 34; Miller, Ancillary
and Pendent Jurisdiction, 26 S. TFx. L.J. I (1985); Teruya, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 31
FED. B. NEws & J. 254 (1984); Note, Problems of Judicial Power and Discretion in Federal Pendent Jurisdiction Cases,
7 Wm, . Mrrcnta. L. REV. 689 (1981).
23. 383 U.S. 715, 725-27 (1966).
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plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding. "24
However, "[t]hat power need not be exercised in every case.... Its justification lies
in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these
are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state
claims . "25 Gibbs instructs the court to dismiss the claims without prejudice. 26 An
intermediate part of the test added after Gibbs requires the court to determine whether
the exercise of jurisdiction would violate a particular federal policy or whether it is
an attempt by plaintiff to manufacture federal jurisdiction when it is otherwise
foreclosed by statute.2 7
Pendent jurisdiction was created to co-exist with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to offer "the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to
the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged. ' ' 28
Together they enable plaintiffs who can claim federal question jurisdiction to choose
between a federal or a state court for their entire case. 29 The theory is that once the
main federal claim is in federal court, that court can more effectively adjudicate the
pendent claims since otherwise the pendent claims would have to be heard as a
completely independent state action, requiring a repetitious presentation of evidence
common to all the claims.30
While Cohill only dealt with the remand of pendent claims, the case is most likely
applicable to claims with an ancillary jurisdictional basis. "Both pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction are judicial doctrines that permit a federal court to exercise jurisdiction
over a party or claim normally not within the scope of federal judicial power. '" 31
Pendent jurisdiction "concerns the resolution of a plaintiff's federal- and state-law
claims against a single defendant in one action.' '32 Ancillary jurisdiction, on the other
hand, "typically involves claims by a defending party haled into court against his will,
or by another person whose rights might be irretrievably lost unless he could assert
them in an ongoing action in a federal court.' ,33 Ancillary jurisdiction often arises in
the context of counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party claims, and interpleader.34
However, "[j]udges and lawyers often do not sharply distinguish between
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction," and the two doctrines had been "moving toward
24. Id. at 725.
25. Id. at 726.
26. Id. at 726-27.
27. Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 989-90 (3d Cir. 1984). See infra notes 37, 80.
28. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).
29. For diversity jurisdiction, an independent basis for jurisdiction for state law claims is not required. State law
claims in such a case would have an independent basis for jurisdiction in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982)
because of the diversity of parties. The amount in controversy required in federal courts for diversity actions of course
must be met for the plaintiff to have the option of initiating the action in federal court.
30. Miller, supra note 22, at 3.
31. Comment, Federal Common Law Power to Remand a Properly Removed Case, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 583,584
n.9 (1987).
32. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978).
33. Id. at 376.
34. See Miller, supra note 22, at 5. For example, A sues B in federal court. Then B counterclaims with a
compulsory counterclaim arising from the same transaction or occurrence as A's claim, but no subject matter jurisdiction
over the counterclaim exists. Ancillary jurisdiction provides the necessary jurisdiction for the federal court to hear the state
law counterclaim. Id.
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each other" and were recently "coalesced" by the Supreme Court. 35 The Court has
deemed that "there is little profit in attempting to decide ... whether there are any
'principled' differences between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction." 36
A key issue when dealing with pendent or ancillary claim remand is whether
such a claim validly exists to be remanded. 37 If there is pendent or ancillary
jurisdiction over the claim, the federal district judge needs to decide whether to
exercise jurisdiction, dismiss, or remand the claim.
III. THE ROLE OF THE REMAND STATUTES FOR PENDENT CLAIM REMAND
A. The Applicability of the Remand Statutes
Removal of cases to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. sections
1441-1452.38 Section 144139 is the general removal statute and allows defendants a
35. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1. 13 (1976); Miller, supra note 22, at 2. See also Note, A Closer Look
at Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1935 (1982); Note,
Developing a Unified Approach to Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: A Merger Made in Heaven, 11 VT. L. REv. 505
(1986).
36. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 13.
37. One problem is pendent party jurisdiction, which concerns whether additional parties may be brought in on a
pendent or ancillary claim. It is an attempt to join a non-Article III claim against one party with ajurisdictionally sufficient
claim against another party. Miller, supra note 22, at 12. For example, in Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. I (1976), the
plaintiff filed a suit under the federal Civil Rights Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), against the county commissioners
and a county treasurer, and sought to name the county as a pendent party by asserting state law claims against it. But
because certain governmental units are not suable under § 1983, the county could not be brought in by pendent jurisdiction
under a parallel state theory. Congress expressly negated the existence ofjurisdiction over a particular party, and pendent
jurisdiction could not be used to circumvent it. Id. at 16-17.
In Lykins v. Pointer, Inc., 725 F.2d 645, 648-49 (1 1th Cir. 1984), the lack of diversity between the plaintiff and
defendants brought in under state law claims was handled through pendent party jurisdiction. The claims were pendent
to claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States and the Federal Aviation Administration.
The court found that the FTCA did not expressly or otherwise negate the federal court's power to try this single case
together in one action. This action could not have been tried in state court since the FICA confers exclusive jurisdiction
on the federal courts. However, the Supreme Court in Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989), held that the FTCA
defines jurisdiction in a manner that does not reach defendants other than the United States; as a result, pendent party
jurisdiction was rejected.
Removal and remand of pendent party claims may entangle the courts with special problems, including partial
remand and partial dismissal. These are beyond the scope of this Comment. See Steinman, Removal, Remand, and Review
in Pendent Claim and Pendent Party Cases, 41 VAN. L. REv. 923, 975-90 (1988).
38. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1452 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), as amended by the Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4669-70 (1988).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which
the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising
under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship
or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988) added
this sentence to the end of § 1441(a): "For purposes of removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued
under fictitious names shall be disregarded."
Section 1441(a) provides the authority for removal of cases within the federal courts' original jurisdiction. Section
1441(b) merely specifies that cases not removed based on federal question jurisdiction, which are basically diversity
jurisdiction cases, cannot be removed if a defendant is a citizen of the state where the action was brought.
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broad power of removal. 40 The most common opportunity for removal arises when a
local plaintiff sues a nonresident defendant in a state court on a claim exceeding
50,000 dollars. 4 1 Since the case originally could have been filed in federal court
based on the parties' diversity of citizenship, the case can be removed. 42 Such
removal is generally justified on the theory of protecting a nonforum defendant from
prejudice in the courts of the forum state.43 Cases based on a federal question can also
be removed. 44 Federal question removal is considered to have been created "to
protect federal rights ... and to provide a forum that could more accurately interpret
federal law.' 45 Claims pendent to jurisdictionally sufficient claims are removable
since they are within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts. The other removal
provisions, sections 1442-1452, specify certain removable actions, 46 nonremovable
actions, 47 and removal procedures. 48
Defendant's removal of the case to federal court, however, is subject to two
general remand statutes, 28 U.S.C. sections 1441(c) and 1447(c). 49 Either the
plaintiff or the court may question the propriety of the remand under these
40. A plaintiff who institutes an action, and against whom a counterclaim is asserted that would be within federal
jurisdiction, cannot remove even though he is in a defensive posture. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100,
106 (1941).
41. The original jurisdiction required under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) is provided by the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1982). The amount in controversy requirement for diversity cases was raised from S10,000 to S50,000 effective
for any civil action commenced on or after May 18, 1989. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No.
100-702, § 201, 102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988).
42. The removal statutes also allow for certain actions to be removed even if they could not have originally been
brought in a federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982) provides for removal when "separate and independent" claims
are joined with "one or more otherwise non-removable claims." Moreover, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442-42a (1982) allow for
removal of actions brought against federal officers, agencies, and members of the armed forces. Such actions are
removable by officers when they assert a substantial federal defense, based on their official capacity, to a state law action
brought against them in state court. Since the federal question comes in by way of defense, there is no original federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). H. FINK & M. TusHNEr, FEDERAL JURISDicrON: Poucv AND PsAcricE
508 (2d ed. 1987).
43. Comment, supra note 31, at 613.
44. See Fousekis & Brelsford, Removal, 11 LmoArToN 39 (1985); Fritsche & Osman, In and Out of Federal Court:
Removal and Remand, 51 Tux. B.J. 85 (1988).
45. Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 246 n.13 (1970) (Brennan, J.).
46. Actions may also be removed when federal officers are defendants, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1982), when
members of the armed services are sued or prosecuted for acts stemming from that status, 28 U.S.C. § 1442a (1982), when
civil rights are implicated, 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982), and when property interests of the United States are at issue, 28
U.S.C. § 1444 (1982).
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (1982). Such nonremovable actions include claims arising under the workmen's
compensation laws of the state where the action is pending. In effect, these prohibitions give the plaintiff a choice between
federal and state forums which the defendant cannot alter.
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1982), as amended by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4669-70 (1988). Note that this amendment rewrote § 1446(b) to prevent removal
on the basis of § 1332 jurisdiction (diversity of citizenship and alienage jurisdiction) more than one year after the
commencement of the action, even if a change in parties creates complete diversity such that the case becomes removable.
49. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(c), 1447(c) (1982), as amended by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988). See supra note 9 for the text of these statutes.
An additional remand provision, to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), states: "If after removal the plaintiff seeks
tojoin additional defendants whosejoinder would destroy subject matterjurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit
joinder and remand the action to the State court." Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988). This remand statute is not applicable to pendent claim remand as discussed in this
Comment because the basis for federal jurisdiction over the pendent claims is federal question and not diversity jurisdiction.
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provisions. 50 The remand statutes must be examined to determine whether they
provide authority for the remand of pendent claims.
Section 1447(c) does not provide support for the power to remand pendent
claims. First, the statute allows for the court to remand if there were any defects in
the removal procedure. A motion to remand must be made within thirty days after
filing of the notice of removal under 28 U.S.C. section 1446(a). 51 Second, the
provision requires remand "if at any time before final judgment it appears that the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction." Section 1447(c) was rewritten
slightly in 1988.52 Before the amendment, section 1447(c) required remand if the
case was "removed improvidently and without jurisdiction." These components
were simply clarified and not substantively altered as a result of the amendment.
53
Removal in Cohill was proper since it was in compliance with the procedures of
the removal statutes54 and was without jurisdictional defects; 55 thus, section 1447(c)
is inapplicable. Congress even made explicit the inapplicability of section 1447(c) to
pendent claim remand in the legislative history of the 1988 removal procedure
amendments, which stated that "[t]he amendment is written in terms of a defect in
'removal procedure' in order to avoid any implication that remand is unavailable after
50. Herrmann, Thermtron Revisited: When and How Federal Trial Court Remand Orders are Reviewable, 19 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 395, 395 (1987).
51. The legislative history of the Judicial Improvements and Access of Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016,
102 Stat. 4642 (1988), states why this waiver provision was added:
So long as the defect in removal procedure does not involve a lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, there
is no reason why either State or Federal courts, or the parties, should be subject to the burdens of shuttling a
case between two courts that each have subject matter jurisdiction. There is also some risk that a party who is
aware of a defect in removal procedure may hold the defect in reserve as a means of forum shopping if the
litigation should take an unfavorable turn.
H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CoD Co N. & ADMiN. NEws 5982, 6033.
52. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988).
53. "Improvidently" generally referred to "'procedural errors in the timing and wording of the removal petition"
and was interpreted to be somewhat discretionary because errors in the removal petition could be waived if prompt
objections were not made. Herrmann, supra note 50, at 404 n.47 (1987). See also In re Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
587 F.2d 642, 647 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978) (removal improvident when "one of the statutory, non-jurisdictional requirements
for removal has not been satisfied"). This waiver is now expressly set forth in section 1447(c) with a limit of 30 days for
asserting defects.
These requirements for remand were read disjunctively, so cases could be remanded if removed either improvidently
or without jurisdiction. FDIC v. Alley, 820 F.2d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404,
413-14 n.13 (1977), which stated that "[w]here the order is based on one of the enumerated grounds, review is
unavailable"). This was also clarified by the 1988 amendment by rewriting the two remand principles into two separate
sentences. See supra note 9.
54. 28 U.S.C. 88 1441-1452 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), as amended by the Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4669-70 (1988).
55. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 617 (1988). Because the district court had jurisdictional
power over the pendent claims under Gibbs, even though it had the discretion not to exercise that power and hear the
pendent claims, "a remand ordered as a matter of discretion not to exercise conceded judicial power is not a remand
predicated on a lack of jurisdiction." Steinman, supra note 37. at 962 (emphasis in original).
In some instances, pendent claims have been remanded under the "without jurisdiction" provision of old § 1447(c).
When the federal claims in a case were claims within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, and
the action was removed to federal court, the district court was without jurisdiction to hear them upon removal. The federal
claims had to be dismissed because the state courts could not hear them, but pendent claims could be remanded because
the action was removed "without jurisdiction" as provided in § 1447(c). Steinman, supra note 37, at 976. This situation
is distinguishable from the remand situation in Cohill because all the removed claims were within the removal jurisdiction
of the federal courts. Coill has no impact on these cases. Id. In any event, this issue is no longer significant since the
addition of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (Supp. IV 1986), which provides that the court to which the action is removed is not
precluded from hearing any claims because the state court did not have jurisdiction over those claims.
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disposition of all federal questions ... that might be decided as a matter of ancillary
or pendent jurisdiction or that instead might be remanded.' 56
The combination of section 1447(c) with the rule governing relation back of
amendments to the time of pleading 57 might seem to authorize pendent claim
remand.5 8 Because an amendment deleting the federal claims would relate back to the
time of the pleading, no federal claims would appear on the face of the complaint at
the time of removal. The removal would be lacking subject matter jurisdiction and the
case would have to be remanded.5 9 This interpretation, however, does not provide a
basis for the power to remand since it unduly stretches section 1447(c). The principle
that remand for lack of jurisdiction is mandatory6° conflicts with the district courts'
discretion to exercise jurisdiction over pendent claims. 6' The district court in Cohill
was not "lack[ing] subject matter jurisdiction" because the court "had jurisdiction
and declined to hear the case despite having jurisdiction.' '62
Section 1441(c) 63 also does not authorize the remand of pendent claims. The
statute provides for removal of the entire case, and then allows the district judge to
remand the "separate and independent" nonremovable claims. It was enacted to
protect the defendant from losing the protection of federal diversity jurisdiction
through the plaintiff's joinder of a nondiverse party in a "separable" claim. 64
Because pendent claims by definition arise out of a "common nucleus of operative
fact," 65 they are not "separate and independent" as required by section 1441(c). 66
56. H.R. RPt. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.%tN. Nmvs 5982,
6033.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
58. See Comment, supra note 31, at 615 n.177.
59. Id.
60. Herrmann, supra note 50, at 404 n.47.
61. See supra text accompanying note 25.
62. Herrmann, supra note 50, at 422 (emphasis in original).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982).
64. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. McCarthy, 708 F.2d 1, 9 (Ist Cir.) (citing Barney v. Latham, 103
U.S. 205, 210 (1881)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983).
65. See supra text accompanying note 24.
66. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 621 (1988). In American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341
U.S. 6, 14 (1951), the Supreme Court held that "where there is a single wrong to plaintiff, for which relief is sought,
arising from an interlocked series of transactions, there is no separate and independent claim or cause of action under
§ 1441(c)." Since all the claims in Cohill arose from the termination of employment, plaintiffs suffered a "single
wrong." See also Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 664 (9th Cir. 1988) (claims against driver and insurance company as
a result of automobile accident were "separate and independent" because the claim against the insurance company
primarily involved the insurer's conduct and other events occurring after the accident); New England Concrete Pipe Corp.
v. DIC Sys. of New England, Inc., 658 F.2d 867 (1st Cir. 1981); Climax Chem. Co. v. C.F. Braun & Co., 370 F.2d
616 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 981 (1967); Salveson v. Western States Bankeard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566,
580 n. 17 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984); 14A C. \VRiGT, A. MilLER &
E. CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDUREi § 3724, at 368 ("It seems reasonable to conclude that claims involving
common questions and stemming from the same transaction do not qualify as separate and independent claims or causes
of action under the Supreme Court's formulation."). A peculiar result occurs when both pendent jurisdiction and the
"separate and independent" provision cannot be used to provide jurisdiction for certain state law claims in federal court.
For example, if pendent party jurisdiction is prohibited for the state claims because Congress has negated such jurisdiction
and the state law claims are too closely related to the jurisdictionally sufficient claims in the case to be "separate and
independent," the claims are restricted to state court. "What sense does it make, after all, to have a tertium quid of certain
state claims-those too distant to be pendent, too close to be 'separate and independent'-that alone, in an 'arising under'
case, the federal court would have no statutory power to hear?" Bonanno Linen, 708 F.2d at 9. This court concluded:
In sum, Aldinger closes the door to these 'pendent party' claims, and § 1441(c) fails to reopen it. We have what
the commentators consider an anomalous 'middle' category of parties left behind in state court. But we see no
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This provision cannot rationally be construed to authorize pendent claim re-
mand. 67
Nevertheless, section 1441(c) does provide a sensible basis for the belief that if
Congress would have enacted statutes dealing with pendent claim remand, it would
have allowed such remand. 68 Federal jurisdiction over state law claims under section
1441(c), like pendent jurisdiction, is another example of a district court exercising
jurisdiction normally not within its judicial power. 69 Section 1441(c) illustrates an
instance in which Congress was willing to allow federal courts to have discretion over
certain state law claims, even though those claims are not generally within the
"judicial power" of the federal courts and are "separate and independent" from the
jurisdictionally sufficient claims in the case. Consequently, discretion to remand
pendent claims is reasonable, particularly since the courts already have broad
discretion to deal with pendent claims.
B. The Immateriality of Statutory Authority
While the validity of pendent claim remand would be easily settled if the remand
statutes provided a logical basis for the discretion to remand, statutory authority is
simply not required for this type of remand. The Supreme Court, not Congress, has
developed the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction and the principles of how it is to be
serious harm arising out of this interpretation of the law. To interpret the words 'separate and independent' more
liberally here would depart from Finn, suggest a different interpretation of these same words in 'arising under'
cases, and thereby proliferate standards in an area already too complex. Any anomaly arising out of the
much-criticized § 1441(e) can be resolved through legislation.
Id. at 10-I1. As aresult, the "arising under" and pendent claims were removed to federal court, but the other state claim
defendants had to be left behind in state court. Id. at 11. As for correcting this anomaly through legislation, the court cites
a proposal by the American Law Institute which would require the district courts to remand all claims not within their
pendent jurisdiction, thus eliminating the use of § 1441(c) and discretionary remand of claims not within its original
jurisdiction in these federal question cases. Id. (citing ALI Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Betveen State and Federal
Courts, 29, 212-13 (1969)).
While the interplay between general pendent jurisdiction and "separate and independent" claims involving the same
parties is unclear, some commentators have suggested that when a defendant removes an "arising under" case, "any state
claims involved are either sufficiently closely related to the federal claims to be considered 'pendent' (and thus removable
under § 144 1(b)), or they are sufficiently unrelated to be considered 'separate and independent' (and thus removable under
§ 1441(c))." Id. at 9. See, e.g., J. MooRE & B. RINGtE, IA MooRE's FEDERAL PRACnCE 0.16314.-5), at 339 & n.33
(2d ed. 1987) ("if a state suit contains at least one claim over which a federal court would have original federal question
jurisdiction and any other claims are properly joined, the entire suit is removable under either § 1441(a) or (b) or
§ 1441(c)" (emphasis in original)). If this is correct, then no "middle category" of cases would exist in which the claims
involved would be neither closely related enough for pendent jurisdiction nor "separate and independent" enough for
jurisdiction under § 1441(c). The federal courts would have statutory power to hear all the claims in an "arising under"
case, absent some difficulty with pendent party jurisdiction as discussed above.
67. But see Herrnann, supra note 50, at 422. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Cohill, Herrmann argued
that § 1441(c) "could reasonably be construed" by the Court to permit such remand: "If state claims can be remanded
so long as they are not intertwined with federal claims, remand arguably should also be permitted when the federal claims
are dismissed and the state claims thus left 'separate and independent."' Id. (emphasis in original).
68. Comment, supra note 31, at 623. See also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 621 (1988). The
majority in Cohill contended that § 1441(c) "actually supports such authority," but the provision does not provide actual
statutory authority.
69. Comment, supra note 31, at 585 n. 12. These claims cannot be classified as either pendent or ancillary because
they are not closely related to the claim providing jurisdiction, see supra text accompanying notes 22-34, and jurisdiction
over them is provided by statute, not by judicial doctrine. However, they are a third instance in which a federal court may
decide state law claims arising between nondiverse parties.
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exercised. 70 Thus, the judge who looks for statutory direction on the exercise of
pendent jurisdiction will "look in vain" 7 1 because "Congress has seen fit to entrust
the development of this area of the law to the courts. "72 For example, while the
district courts are supposed to dismiss the pendent state claims if the federal claims
are dismissed before trial, 73 no statute authorizes dismissal of a case properly before
the court. 74
It can hardly be a "fundamental constitutional principle that the jurisdiction of
the inferior federal courts is dependent on specific statutory authorization" 75 when
the pendent jurisdiction doctrine itself has no statutory authorization. 76 It is ludicrous
to expect Congress to address the remand of pendent claims by statute when the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine itself is completely nonstatutory and is based on the
foundation provided in Gibbs.
Nevertheless, Congress has infrequently provided for pendent jurisdiction by
statute in certain cases. For example, in the patent and intellectual property areas,
"It]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a
claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the
copyright, patent, plant variety protection or trade-mark laws." ' 77 However, Con-
gress has never attempted to define general pendent jurisdiction statutorily. It only
applies the doctrine in specific instances to make sure that such jurisdiction is
70. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437
U.S. 365 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Rosado
v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
71. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1046, 1052 (3d Cir. 1986) (Stapleton, J.,
dissenting), granting mandamus in Boyle v. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 648 F. Supp. 1318 (W.D. Pa. 1985), vacated and
reh'g granted, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1888 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided court, No. 85-3619,
slip op. (3d Cir. Nov. 24, 1986) (en bane), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988).
72. Id. See also Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). Inquiry into the statutory grant of jurisdiction is not
required because "Congress ha[s] not addressed itself by statute to this matter" and has "left the way open for the Court
to fashion its own rules under Art. Ill." Id. at 13, 15.
73. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
74. Cohill, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1052 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
Based on the principle of Congress' silence with respect to the ability of the district courts to dismiss pendent claims,
the majority in Cohill did argue that:
the removal statute does not address specifically any aspect of a district court's power to dispose of pendent
state-law claims after removal: just as the statute makes no reference to a district court's power to remand
pendent claims, so too the statute makes no reference to a district court's power to dismiss them. Yet petitioners
concede, as they must, that a federal court has discretion to dismiss a removed case involving pendent claims.
Given that Congress's silence in the removal statute does not negate the power to dismiss such cases, that silence
cannot sensibly be read to negate the power to remand them.
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 620-21 (1988) (emphasis in original). However, this justification for
pendent claim remand is flawed because Rule 8 1(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes the Rules applicable
to removed actions and the Rules authorize dismissals on a broad range of grounds. Moreover, courts historically have
had an inherent power to dismiss cases for discretionary reasons. Steinman, supra note 37, at 958. Thus, "any special
congressional grant of the power to dismiss a removed case would have been redundant, and hence superfluous." Id.
While "a congressional silence that does not negate the power to dismiss can very sensibly be read to negate the power
to remand," id. at 959 (emphasis added), this Comment demonstrates that other considerations justify the power to
remand pendent claims.
75. Cohill, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1051.
76. See id. at 1052 (Stapleton, J., dissenting) ("Given the absence of statutory law relating to the exercise of
pendent jurisdiction generally, it is not surprising that Congress has not expressly addressed the subject of remand in the
context of a case in which an exercise of pendent jurisdiction has been found to be no longer appropriate.").
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1982).
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available in the district courts, especially when the federal jurisdiction providing the
pendent jurisdiction is exclusive.78
C. The Nonpreclusive Effect of the Remand Statutes
Although the remand statutes provide no authority for pendent claim remand, the
statutes must be further examined to ascertain whether they limit the ability to remand
pendent claims. 79 Jurisdictional power over pendent claims is not boundless but is
constrained by statutes. 80 Before a court can conclude whether jurisdiction exists over
a state law claim or whether a claim can be manipulated in a certain way, it must
determine that "Congress in the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or
by implication negated its existence."' S
The Cohill dissent contended that since Congress chose specifically to provide
for two situations when courts are to remand cases, 82 the courts cannot remand in
other circumstances. 83 Congress would never have enacted the remand statutes if it
thought that the courts had a broad power to remand. By finding a third category of
cases that may be remanded, the majority rendered the remand statutes "wholly
superfluous. "84
Although Congress has only dealt with the remand of two types of cases, it has
not indicated that it prohibits remand of pendent claims once a federal court has
decided not to entertain them, and on the contrary has approved of the procedure. 85
The idea that the remand statutes limit pendent claim remand is an "unduly rigid
reading" '8 6 of the statutes which do not even discuss pendent claims. As the majority
in Cohill pointed out, the statutes do not conflict with pendent claim remand. 87 The
statutes merely provide that in one case, claims must be remanded, 88 and in another,
claims may be remanded in the court's discretion.8 9 The provisions need not be read
to be exclusive of all potential remand power. 90
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982) (Historical and Revision Notes). Subsection (b) is intended to avoid "piecemeal"
litigation by permitting enforcement in a single civil action in the district court. "While this is the rule under Federal
decisions, this section would enact it as statutory authority." Id.
79. See Comment, supra note 31, at 595.
80. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978). The power over state law claims is also
limited by the provisions in Article III of the Constitution.
In Owen, 437 U.S. at 377, the congressionally mandated complete diversity requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)
(1982), as interpreted by Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), prevented the district court from having
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claim against a nondiverse impleaded defendant.
81. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976). See Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction Primer: The
Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DAvts L. Rev. 103, 167-68 (1983).
82. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(c), 1447(c) (1982), as amended by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988).
83. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 624 (1988) (White, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 89 n.4 (4th Cir. 1983). See supra note 56 and accompanying text for Congress'
recent acceptance of pendent claim remand.
86. Id.
87. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. at 621 n.ll.
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982). as amended by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub.
L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988).
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982).
90. See Comment, supra note 31, at 604 (determining whether any statute limits discretion over pendent claims
1989]
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Besides the two general remand statutes, 28 U.S.C. section 1452 provides for
removal and remand of claims related to bankruptcy cases. 91 Since Congress
addressed the remand of claims in this specific area, it could have provided for
statutory pendent claim remand if it wanted the district courts to have that power.
However, as discussed previously, 92 a general pendent claim remand statute would be
unexpected and is unnecessary.
One could also argue that the expression of one thing in a statute is the exclusion
of another, expressio unius, exclusio alterius,93 but again, Congress would have had
no reason to address pendent claim remand in the remand statutes. Also noteworthy
is that the removal statutes are strictly construed against removal to comply with
congressional intent "to limit the right of removal out of concern for state courts'
independent jurisdiction." 94 This policy objective is best served by allowing pendent
claim remand, since by remanding the claims the district courts will be allowing the
state courts to hear them.95
Nevertheless, the dissent insisted that the majority's holding could not be
reconciled with Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer.96 In Thermtron, the
Court determined that a diversity case could not be remanded for the reason that it
would be more quickly adjudicated in state court. Such remand was not specifically
authorized by statute. 97 The problem with Thermtron for pendent claim remand is that
"does not assume that a jurisdictional statute restrictively defines all permissible exercises of judicial power" (emphasis
in original)).
It has been argued that because the removal and remand statutes were passed in substantially their present form in
1948 and the modem pendent jurisdiction was not articulated until 1966 in Gibbs, Congress should not be expected to
address this matter statutorily. Note, Recognizing the Power to Remand: A Move Back to Fairness, 18 STErsoN L. Rev.
191, 204-05 (1988). While this is partially correct because it recognizes that pendent jurisdiction and nonfederal claims
have been left to the courts to handle, see supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text, it fails to recognize that Congress
could certainly have adopted other removal provisions in the years since Gibbs and that pendent jurisdiction has existed
for a long time before Gibbs articulated the current test. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933) (earlier pendent
jurisdiction test).
91. See Gibson, Removal of Claims Related to Bankruptcy Cases: What is a "Claim or Cause of Action"?, 34
UCLA L. REv. 1 (1986). 28 U.S.C. § 1452 (Supp. IV 1986) provides:
(a) A party may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil action other than a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court or a civil action by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or
regulatory power, to the district court for the district where such civil action is pending, if such district court
has jurisdiction of such claim or cause of action under section 1334 of this title.
(b) The court to which such claim or cause of action is removed may remand such claim or cause of action on
any equitable ground. An order entered under this subsection remanding a claim or cause of action, or a decision
not to remand, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
92. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
93. See United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 741 (1832); Arthur v. Cumming, 91 U.S. 362, 364
(1875).
94. Cook v. Weber, 698 F.2d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100,
108-09 (1941)). One court noted that "almost all Supreme Court decisions expounding the law of removal have been in
the context of holding that removal was unwarranted." Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 576 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1049 (1982).
95. The court in Cook argued that in order to effectuate congressional policy on removal, the basis for remanding
a removed case must be grounded on federal statutory authority. Cook, 698 F.2d at 909. However, this seems contrary
to the congressional policy, because demanding strict compliance with the removal statutes and refusing to allow district
courts to remand pendent claims forces the district courts either to retain jurisdiction over the pendent claims or to dismiss
them, thus not really protecting state courts' independent jurisdiction.
96. 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
97. See id. at 345, 351.
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the case seems to imply that the district courts are limited in remanding cases for
statutory reasons. 9
8
However, the aggressive assertions against nonstatutory remand in Thermtron
were induced by the "clearly impermissible" 99 nature of the remand.'°° The case did
not hold that discretion is prohibited from the remand process.it ' A careful reading
of Thermtron indicates that the case is distinguishable from the remand of pendent
claims.
Therntron held that the district court judge exceeded his authority in remanding
on "grounds that he had no authority to consider." 10 2 But in determining whether to
remand pendent claims, a judge can consider grounds of judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness because he is authorized to do so to determine whether to
dismiss pendent claims.' 0 3 While a "properly removed action may no more be
remanded because the district court considers itself too busy" than it may be
dismissed for such a reason°4-for example the diversity case in Thermtron which
the federal court was required to hear' 05 -a case might be remanded when the court
considers valid reasons which authorize it to dismiss. As the Court in Cohill stated:
"The implication . . . is that an entirely different situation is presented when the
district court has clear power to decline to exercise jurisdiction."1 06
In Thermtron, the Court was not convinced that Congress intended to extend
"carte blanche authority to the district courts to revise the federal statutes governing
removal" 10 7 because the judge attempted to remand for an unorthodox reason. In
allowing pendent claim remand, however, a court is hardly being granted "carte
blanche": it is limited to remanding pendent claims, with its decisions reversible by
an abuse of discretion standard. 108 The Cohill dissent complained that there is no limit
to the power to remand because it is based on the "amorphous reasons of 'economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity' that may seem justifiable to the majority but that
have not been recognized by Congress." 109 But the courts already possess the same
discretion to dismiss pendent claims, and Congress has not been apprehensive about
discretion based on these "amorphous reasons" since it has not attempted to
98. Boyle v. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 648 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (W.D. Pa. 1985), mandamus granted sub noma.
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1046 (3d Cir. 1986), vacated and reh'g granted, 41
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1888 (3d Cir. 1986). aff'd by an equally divided court, No. 85-3619, slip op. (3d Cir. Nov.
24, 1986) (en bane), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988).
99. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 621 (1988).
100. In re Romulus Community Schools, 729 F.2d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 1984). See Comment, supra note 31, at 601,
604 (discretion is "not an element of any congressional grant of jurisdiction, but a function of the need for case-by-case
refinement of broad statutory provisions" and Thermtron is therefore limited to its facts (citing Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 574 (1987))).
101. IMFC Professional Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Latin Am. Home Health, Inc., 676 F.2d 152, 159 (5th Cir. 1982).
102. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351 (1976).
103. See supra text accompanying note 25.
104. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 344.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982) (the diversity statute provides for mandatory jurisdiction).
106. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 622 (1988).
107. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351.
108. See D. CRUIP, W. DogsANEo. 0. CHASE & R. PERSCHBACHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCFDURE 816
(1987) ("A discretionary decision will not be reversed unless the appellate court is convinced that the trial court was
clearly wrong.").
109. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 624 (1988) (White, J., dissenting).
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invalidate pendent jurisdiction. The recognition of a discretionary power to remand
pendent claims would not "create an unwieldly situation with no effective boundaries
to control the exercise of that discretion," ' 10 when district courts already have the
same discretion to dismiss pendent claims. Furthermore, the separate remand
provision for bankruptcy cases"' demonstrates Congress' lack of concern over
remand provisions bestowing extraordinary discretion upon district judges. It allows
remand "on any equitable ground," and the remand order or decision not to remand
is not reviewable. The "equitable grounds" that district courts can consider 12 are
similar to the Gibbs considerations.
Thermtron is also distinguishable from pendent claim remand because in the
latter instance there is no right to have remanded claims heard in a federal forum.
Unlike the Thermtron situation in which Congress established a right to have a claim
heard by a federal court and the district court judge attempted to deny that statutory
right, 13 parties have no right to have pendent claims adjudicated by a federal
court. 114 Pendent claims are constantly teetering on the precipice of federal
jurisdiction because the issue of jurisdiction "remains open throughout the
litigation."115 While remand somewhat "frustrate[s] Congress' purpose in providing
a right of removal""t 6 by returning the claims to state court, it does not frustrate any
right to have pendent claims adjudicated in a federal forum following removal. 117
Congress never intended for the courts to treat pendent claims differently after
removal than if originally brought in federal court 81 and only meant to protect from
remand cases that come under federal statutory jurisdiction. "19
One might respond that the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to allow
remands based upon events subsequent to removal-including the amending of the
110. Brief for Petitioners at 17, Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988) (No. 86-1021).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b) (Supp. IV 1986). See supra note 91 for the text of this provision.
112. District courts can ponder the following considerations in deciding whether to remand bankruptcy cases:
(I) forum non conveniens; (2) that the entire action of a bifurcated matter should be tried in the same court; (3)
that a state court is better able to resolve state law questions; (4) expertise of a particular court; (5) judicial
economy; (6) prejudice to the involuntarily removed party; (7) comity; and (8) the lessened possibility of an
inconsistent result.
Thomasson v. Amsouth Bank, N.A., 59 Bankr. 997, 1008 n.9 (N.D. Ala. 1986) (citing Browning v. Navarro, 743 F.2d
1069, 1076 n.21 (5th Cir. 1984)).
113. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1046, 1053 (3d Cir. 1986) (Stapleton,
J., dissenting).
114. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). See also In re Romulus Community Schools,
729 F.2d 431, 437 (6th Cir. 1984) ("the court had uncontroverted authority to refuse to hear the case after the federal
claim was dismissed").
115. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727. The Court also stated that "recognition of a federal court's wide latitude to decide
ancillary questions of state law does not imply that it must tolerate a litigant's effort to impose upon it what is in effect
only a state law case." Id.
116. Cohill, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1051. The court also stated that "[a] defendant who exercises that
right might thereafter be subject to duplicative and costly subsequent state proceedings." Id.
117. See Comment, supra note 31, at 602, 619 ("Providing for removal jurisdiction indicates Congress's policy
determination that defendants can choose to litigate certain cases in a federal forum," but "the duty of a federal court to
exercise jurisdiction over such a case should hardly be considered 'clear and indisputable.' "). See also id. at 607-16.
118. Id. at 623.
119. Id. at 619. The history of pendent claims and removal jurisdiction between the Civil War and 1887
"demonstratefs] Congress's intent not to confer on state court defendants the right to have incidental claims adjudicated
by a federal court after removal." Id. at 607. Through additional remand statutes in 1887, "Congress demonstrated its
concern that removal jurisdiction not usurp the traditional role of state courts." Id. at 614.
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complaint, the joinder of a party, or the reduction in requested damages below the
jurisdictional amount. 120 These cases are distinguishable from pendent claim
remand.12 In the latter case, the district court has determined that the state law claims
should not be heard in federal court and is simply remanding the case rather than
dismissing it. An amendment deleting the federal claim does not "defeat federal
jurisdiction" 122 with respect to the pendent claims, although it occurs subsequent to
removal, because the court is merely refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent
claims for judicial economy and state comity reasons. Events occurring after removal
can properly affect the district court's discretionary decision of whether to exercise its
jurisdiction over the pendent claims. 123 If the judge decides to dismiss pendent
claims, he can instead remand the claims after assuring himself that manipulation of
the forum has not occurred. 124
Because the statutory provisions do not limit the exercise of pendent claim
remand, the district courts are free to remand pendent claims if some authority can be
found for that power.
IV. JUSTIFICATION FOR PENDENT CLAIM REMAND THROUGH THE
PENDENT JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
The discretion to remand pendent claims to state court following removal is
proper since it is based on "clearly articulated authority."' 25 While statutory
authority is not required, 126 a judge cannot merely concoct discretion because he
thinks it would be beneficial; courts must provide an explanation for not exercising
jurisdiction which is based on the historical context of the legislative grant.127
A federal court's common law authority over pendent claims from United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs128 furnishes support for pendent claim remand. Although Gibbs
only spoke of dismissal of pendent claims, remand was not an option for the Court
since the case was originally brought in federal court. 129 Nevertheless, Gibbs
120. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 291-93 (1938) (jurisdiction not lost
through plaintiff's subsequent reduction of his claim to less than the jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement);
Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939) (second amended complaint should not have been considered in
determining the right to remove); Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236, 238-39 (1886) (court not ousted of jurisdiction by
admitting a co-defendant, pursuant to a state statute, which destroyed diversity).
121. Lovell Mfg. v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, 843 F.2d 725, 735 (3d Cir. 1988) ("to the extent a
black-letter rule ever existed, precluding a court from relying on post-removal events to determine whether to exercise
pendent jurisdiction, the Supreme Court clearly did not feel bound by it in [Cohill]").
122. Westmoreland Hosp. Ass'n v. Blue Cross, 605 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1077
(1980).
123. Steinman, supra note 37, at 974.
124. See infra notes 172-88 and accompanying text.
125. IMFC Professional Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Latin Am. Home Health, Inc., 676 F.2d 152, 160 (5th Cir. 1982).
126. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
127. See Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 575 (1985). But cf. Redish, Abstention,
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YAt L.J. 71, 115 (1984) (Abstention constitutes
"judicial lawmaking" which violates the separation of powers: "it is not the judiciary's function to modify or repeal a
congressional enforcement network" unless authorized by Congress, and "throughout the nation's history, Congress has
retained for itself the authority to decide when federal courts should decline to exercise their jurisdiction.").
128. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
129. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 619 (1988). Although Gibbs had nothing to do with removal
and thus the Court would have had no reason to discuss remand, the dissent in Cohill curiously argued that "[t]he Gibbs
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indicated that if it is inappropriate to assert jurisdiction,130 the pendent claims may be
"left for resolution to state tribunals,"' 13 and remand, like dismissal, would serve
that objective. ' 32 As the Supreme Court stated in Cohill:
Gibbs establishes that the pendent jurisdiction doctrine is designed to enable courts to handle
cases involving state-law claims in the way that will best accommodate the values of
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, and Gibbs further establishes that the judicial
branch is to shape and apply the doctrine in that light.133
Two major fairness issues need to be addressed when remand power over
pendent claims is granted to district courts: statutes of limitations barring plaintiff's
pendent state law claims and potential forum manipulation by the plaintiff.
A. Statutes of Limitations Barring the Pendent Claims
Without discretion to remand, dismissal of the plaintiff's pendent claims after
the statutes of limitations on the claims have expired would preclude the plaintiff
from litigating his claims. 134 While the plaintiff bears the risk of insubstantial federal
law claims and dismissal of the pendent claims when he brings an action in federal
court, considerations of fairness are different when the defendant removes the action
from state court because the defendant controls access to federal court.135 Once
substantial claims are brought in state court, they should remain in the judicial system
and should not be thwarted from adjudication on the merits merely because the
defendant removed the case to federal court and that forum is deemed to be
inappropriate for litigating the claims. Judicial economy and convenience may be
hampered because the potential bar to relief after removal may chill plaintiffs from
bringing removable federal law claims in state court, especially if the validity of the
claims is debatable. 136 Furthermore, a litigant who has initiated a federal law claim
with state law claims might genuinely discover the inviability of the federal law claim
and the need for voluntary dismissal,137 or an involuntary dismissal or other
adjudication of the federal claim may occur. ' 38
opinion did not even suggest any inherent power in the federal courts to remand pendent claims." Id. at 625 (White, J.,
dissenting).
130. The remand of pendent claims might occur even when the federal claims are still in federal court, and the judge
feels that the state court should hear the claims. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water, 858 F.2d
1409, 1417 (9th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff's claims severed from a federal common law claim and remanded to state court to
give them a "sure-footed reading of applicable law," even though federal court has made a substantial commitment of
judicial resources to the state claims).
131. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27.
132. Contra Steinman, supra note 37, at 969.
133. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 619 (1988).
134. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. at 619.
135. Comment, supra note 31, at 621-22. But see Cook v. Weber, 698 F.2d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Plaintiffs
in such circumstances cannot complain that they are forced to try what turns out to be a purely state law claim in federal
court, since it was plaintiff's decision to contain a federal claim in the original complaint which enabled defendant to
remove to federal court.").
136. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. at 619-20 n.9.
137. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
138. Potential reasons for involuntary dismissal include summary judgment, directed verdict, failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, insufficiency of process or service of process, improper venue, lack of personal or
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With the power to remand pendent state law claims available to district court
judges, plaintiffs should be less likely to expend needless time and energy in litigating
attenuated and frivolous federal claims simply to prevent the state claims from being
time-barred due to dismissal from federal court. 139 As for substantial federal claims
brought by plaintiffs, the district courts might be inclined to dispose of them more
swiftly: since authority to remand assures that there will be no time bars on pendent
state law claims, the district judges do not need to be concerned with preserving a
forum for those claims by maintaining jurisdiction over federal law claims. 140
A plaintiff might defeat removal in the first instance by avoiding federal
allegations in his state court action since he has the election of whether or not to
engineer a complaint with such claims. 14' But a plaintiff might be barred by res
judicata from later litigating his federal claims if he fails to bring them with his state
claims in the first action, 142 so he will have to ponder this weighty consideration in
deciding whether to avoid instituting the federal claim.
Justice White's dissent in Cohill complained that states have sufficiently
protected plaintiffs whose federal law claims prove unsound by enacting saving
clauses which negate the time bar on the other claims. 43 Saving clauses generally
provide that when a party has timely commenced an action that fails for some reason
unrelated to the merits, another action for the same cause may be brought within a
limited period following dismissal of the first action.144 A statute of limitations will
not be a bar to the second action if that action is within the scope of the saving
subject matter jurisdiction, and dismissals for mootness, ripeness, standing, exhaustion of remedies, and other prudential
and abstention principles.
139. Note, supra note 90, at 206.
140. Id. This note also contended that since defendants are more likely to face litigation in state court if their claims
are remanded rather than dismissed and possibly refiled, there may be a tendency to avoid pursuing a dismissal or
summary judgment of a federal claim. Id. This seems implausible, however, because a defendant has a natural tendency
to want to have claims against him, and thus any potential liability, dismissed. Furthermore, plaintiffs can easily reassert
dismissed claims in state court unless they are barred by statutes of limitations, so the likelihood of facing state court
litigation is truly similar in both instances.
141. Austwick v. Board of Educ., 555 F. Supp. 840, 842 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("[Wlhen a plaintiff chooses a state
forum, yet also elects to press federal claims, he runs the risk of removal.... If a state forum is more important to the
plaintiff than his federal claims, he should have to make that assessment before the case is jockeyed from state court to
federal court and back to state court."). See also Jones v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 541 F.2d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 1976)
("the plaintiff has the prerogative of determining the theory of his action and, so long as fraud is not involved, he may
defeat removal to the federal courts by avoiding allegations which provide a basis for the assertion of federal
jurisdiction").
142. Res judicata requires that a plaintiff litigate his entire claim in one judicial proceeding and precludes him from
later reasserting the same claim against the same defendant or a party in privity. REsTATE'MlENT (SECOND) OF JUstnrEs § 17
(1980); Matasar, supra note 81, at 111-14 & n.40; Vestal, Extent of Claim Preclusion, 54 IowA L. REv. 1(1968); Vestal,
Res JudicatalClaim Preclusion: Judgment for the Claimant, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 357 (1967).
143. Cohzill, 108 S. Ct. at 625 (White, J., dissenting). See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-504 (Supp. 1988);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-56-126 (Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-592 (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 8118 (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-217 (Smith-Hurd 1984); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 260, § 32 (1986); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Anderson 1984); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100 (1981 & Supp. 1984); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5535 (Purdon 1981).
The Pennsylvania saving statute provides in part:
If a civil action or proceeding is timely commenced and is terminated, a party ... may ... commence a new
action or proceeding upon the same cause of action within one year after the termination and any other party
may interpose any defense or claim which might have been interposed in the original action or proceeding.
42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5535(a)(1) (Purdon 1981).
144. W. FEtousoN, THE STATUTES OF LLMITATION SAVING STATUTES 1 (1978).
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clause.145 Because these clauses are not present in every state, plaintiffs in states
without a mechanism for preserving claims will be inequitably barred as compared to
plaintiffs in other states.' 46 The irrationality and deficiency of such protection is
amplified when the sole remedy to stay the limitations bar completely in this manner
is the enactment of saving clauses by these states, 147 a possibility far from certain.
In Cohill, the Pennsylvania saving statute would not have saved the plaintiffs'
pendent claims even if the district court had dismissed rather than remanded them
because the action was dismissed voluntarily by the plaintiffs. 148 The filing of a new
action would be time-barred under the Pennsylvania statute of limitations regarding
tort actions. 149 The dissent contended that the saving clause would have saved the
claims had the federal claims been dismissed involuntarily rather than voluntarily. 15 0
It would refuse the saving of pendent claims, out of concern for forum manipulation,
if the federal claims which provided the basis for federal court jurisdiction were
voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs. However, plaintiffs may find it necessary to
dismiss their federal claims and thus would be unjustly barred from litigating their
state law claims which were validly initiated in state court.t 5 1 In deciding whether
plaintiffs may be prejudicially hindered from litigating their claims, courts can take
into account the purposes of statutes of limitations. Besides encouraging the diligence
of plaintiffs 52 and providing notice to the defendant, 153 statutes of limitations are
designed "to afford security against stale demands, after the true state of the
145. Id.
146. See Cohill, 108 S. Ct. at 620 n.10.
147. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1046, 1051 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The
serious limitations problem . . . can be readily ameliorated by enactment of such clauses by the remaining states.");
Steinman, supra note 37, at 971 (dismissal of pendent claims by the federal courts sitting in states without saving clauses
"might trigger state legislative or judicial action to save the state law claims." (emphasis added)).
148. The statute excludes from saving actions terminated by "voluntary nonsuitis]" and "discontinuancels]." 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5535(a)(2)(ii) (Purdon 1981).
The Pennsylvania statute providing for transfer and preservation of erroneously filed matters, 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5103 (Purdon 1981 & Supp. 1988), would be inapplicable to the remand of pendent claims unless the district court
determined that jurisdiction over the federal claim, which provides for pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims, was
lacking. See Weaver v. Marine Bank, 683 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1972) (because federal securities law jurisdiction was
lacking, proper disposition of pendent state law claims was to transfer them pursuant to the Pennsylvania statute). Contra
Steinman, supra note 37, at 971 & n.238 (Pennsylvania statute would prevent any state law claim that had been dismissed
without prejudice by a federal court after removal from being time-barred).
149. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524 (Purdon 1981 & Supp. 1988).
150. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 626 (1988) (White, J., dissenting).
151. But see W. FEGUSON, supra note 144, at 312. Ferguson states that:
If the first suit gives notice to the defendant of the nature of the claim, then the primary purpose of the statute
has been fulfilled. However, the reason to give relief from the statutes of limitations is to save plaintiff from
foundering on procedural technicalities that prevent a trial on the merits. If the action is voluntarily dismissed
by plaintiff rather than foundering on procedural technicalities, then it is not within the reason of the [saving)
statute and should not be encompassed within it. To permit such use of the statute provides the plaintiff with
a tool to enable it to defeat the trial of the action and thus defeat the secondary purpose of limitations, trial of
the merits while memories are still fresh.
Id. at 312.
However, Ferguson continues with a possible exception: "To deny the benefits of the saving statute in cases
involving voluntary nonsuits would seem to be unfair only in those cases when the first suit is in troubled waters and the
court is delaying making the decision bringing it to a halt." Id. An action in "troubled waters" might include a case in
federal court with only pendent claims remaining following dismissal of the inviable federal issue by the plaintiff in good
faith; thus the volitional nature of the dismissal should probably be ignored with respect to the saving statutes.
152. Id. at 59.
153. Id. at 312.
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transactions may have been forgotten, or be incapable of explanation, by reason of
the death or removal of witnesses."' 54
Instead of dismissing the pendent claims, the district court may retain pendent
jurisdiction over them to protect them from being barred by statutes of limitations.15 5
This is hardly satisfying because the claims properly belong in state court.156 Purely
state claims should be expunged from federal courts whenever possible since there is
no policy reason for those courts to hear them: "[w]here the federal element which
is the basis for jurisdiction is disposed of early in the case, as on the pleadings, it
smacks of the tail wagging the dog to continue with a federal hearing of the state
claim."' 57 Eighteen states agreed with this proposition and submitted an amicus
curiae brief to the Supreme Court in the Cohill action in favor of pendent claim
remand. 158 When the plaintiff deletes his federal question claim, he is indicating that
he no longer needs his federal rights guarded. 159 Moreover, the defendant's right of
removal to protect his right to have federal claims heard in federal court does not need
to be preserved.' 60 The pendent claims are now pendent to nothing and are left
dangling in federal court.
Recognizing discretion to remand would allow the district courts to focus on the
factors outlined in Gibbs, 161 including the avoidance of "[n]eedless decisions of state
law." 62 It is outlandish to force a federal court to decide unsettled questions of state
law or other questions more properly decided by the state court merely because the
plaintiff may be prevented from refiling in state court when the case could otherwise
validly be dismissed. 163
Another option to protect pendent claims from the interdiction of statutes of
limitations and to avoid the retention of the claims in federal court is to condition the
dismissal of the pendent claims upon the defendant's waiver of the statute of
limitations defense in a promptly recommenced state court suit. 164 A defendant who
wants to remain in federal court could refuse to comply with the condition and force
154. Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 351, 360 (1828) (Story, J.).
155. Cook v. Weber, 698 F.2d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 1983).
156. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 620 n. 10 (1988).
157. McFaddin Express, Inc. v. Adley Corp., 346 F.2d 424, 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1965). See
also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966).
158. Amici Curiae Brief of States of Ala., Alaska, Ark., Cal., Haw., Idaho, Ind., Ky., La., Nev., N.M., Ohio,
S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Wash. and Wis. in Support of Respondents, Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614
(1988) (No. 86-1021).
159. Note, supra note 90, at 208.
160. Id.
161. In re Romulus Community Schools, 729 F.2d 431, 439 (6th Cir. 1984).
162. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Such decisions are to be avoided "both as a matter of comity and to promote justice
between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law." Id. Claims "relatively novel,
complex and of great local importance" should be withdrawn from federal court. Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 90 (4th Cir.
1983).
Other factors the courts are to consider in deciding whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction include: (1) whether the
federal claims were dismissed before trial; (2) whether the state issues substantially predominate; (3) whether the state
claim is closely tied to federal policy; and (4) the likelihood of jury confusion. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27.
163. Romulus, 729 F.2d at 439. See also Quality Foods de Centro Am., S.A. v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev.
Corp., S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 1000 (1 1th Cir. 1983) ("It is not the function of a federal court to rescue a party from the
danger of limitation by permitting the litigation of inappropriate matters in federal court.").
164. Steinman, supra note 37, at 971 & n.239 (citing cases).
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the federal court to adjudicate the pendent claims. 165 While this might be a rare
occurrence since defendants will not likely choose to irritate the federal court
judge, 166 the undesirable potential of forcing federal courts to hear claims that belong
in state court is certainly still present, especially since the defendant may feel that he
-will benefit from such an adjudication.
If federal courts are constrained to retain jurisdiction because they are not
allowed to remand, it may be an abuse of discretion for a trial court to dismiss
pendent claims after the statute of limitations has run. 167 But to retain jurisdiction
over claims that belong in state court might be an abuse of discretion. 168 By
precluding judges from remanding pendent claims, the dissent would place the courts
in a perplexing quandary.
This dilemma is still present after Cohill when a cause of action originates in
federal court since remand to state court to save the pendent claims from being time-
barred is not an option. District courts, in both removed and originally initiated cases,
have often considered in the balance of factors under Gibbs whether to retain
jurisdiction over pendent claims because of statutes of limitations and the unavail-
ability of another forum. 169 The district court might have a difficult time balancing
the considerations when other factors mitigate against the federal court adjudicating
the claims. Thus, the remand power frees the courts from this particular problem in
removed cases. It allows the courts to focus on the key pendent jurisdiction
factors-state comity, judicial economy, and convenience-instead of time bars
from statutes of limitations.
Recognizing the authority to remand will result in a different balancing
depending on whether state law claims are initiated in federal or state court.' 7 0
Pendent claims contained in similar cases may be adjudicated differently depending
on their procedural history. Nonetheless, the beneficial effect of more intelligent and
165. Id. at 971.
166. Id.
167. Herrmann, supra note 50, at 423. "Fairness to litigants" might require the federal court to retain jurisdiction
and hear the remaining state law claims. See, e.g., Quality Foods, 711 F.2d at 999-1000 (11 th Cir. 1983); Fontaine v.
Home Box Office, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 298, 302 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
168. See, e.g., Financial Gen. Bankshares v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (abuse of discretion in
exercising pendent jurisdiction over novel and unsettled question of District of Columbia law after dismissal of the federal
claim).
169. See, e.g., Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 843 F.2d 658, 665 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[a]n alternative forum is available to
the plaintiffs in the state courts"); United States v. Zima, 766 F.2d 1153, 1158 (7th Cir. 1985) (fairness in the balance
of factors particularly relates to the "prejudicial passage of state limitations periods"); Pharo v. Smith, 625 F.2d 1226,
1227 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Itlhat a plaintiff's state law claims will be time-barred if dismissed is certainly a factor, if not a
determinative factor, a district court should consider in deciding whether to maintain jurisdiction over pendent state claims
once the federal claims have been resolved"); O'Brien v. Continental I11. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54, 65 (7th
Cir. 1979) (state law claims should not have been dismissed involuntarily because "plaintiffs should have been permitted
to pursue their pendent state claims in the federal actions.., when there [was] a substantial possibility that a subsequent
state court suit on the claim [would] be time-barred"); Baez v. American Cyanamid Co., 685 F. Supp. 303, 309
(D.C.P.R. 1988) (following Cohill, the court was only concerned with whether the plaintiff could litigate in the local
courts); Kaib v. Pennzoil Co., 545 F. Supp. 1267, 1271 (W.D. Pa. 1982) ("[wle have deliberately selected a remand as
to the added defendants, rather than dismissal, because plaintiff may be prejudiced by interdiction of the statute of
limitations").
170. The dissent in Cohill argued that because the plaintiff commenced the pendent claims in state court, the claims
are less likely to be adversely affected by statutes of limitations than claims initiated in federal court. Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 625 (1988) (White, J., dissenting).
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reasoned balancing in some cases justifies any inconsistencies. The disparity in the
balancing may be paradoxical, but it is not unfair. No way currently exists to avoid
the time bar fairness concern for causes of action initiated in federal court. Remand
is always possible following removal of a case, but no procedure other than dismissal
is available for disposal of claims initiated in federal court. Besides, the remand
procedure is not being used merely to save a plaintiff's claims, but as the traditional
procedure used following removal in order to get claims out of federal court.
The district courts might not even give the time bar concern much weight in the
balance for pendent claims initiated in federal court. They might retain jurisdiction
over the pendent claims only if fairness strongly demands retention; the other Gibbs
considerations are likely to be deemed more important and outweigh any element of
fairness.' 7' As a result, the potential for significant incongruities in the balance of
factors in substantively similar but procedurally different cases may be further
reduced.
B. Forum Manipulation by the Plaintiff
Forum manipulation by the plaintiff is improper because it results in delay and
expense to a defendant and is a needless burden on the resources of the judicial
system. Cohill appropriately handles the problem of forum manipulation by the
plaintiff. 72 Prohibiting the remand of all cases involving pendent claims out of
concern for forum manipulation is absurd. The district court can consider in the Gibbs
balance of factors whether the plaintiff has been jockeying the defendant between
state and federal courts. 173 To be fair to defendants, the courts should be more willing
171. "[AIlthough the potential statute of limitations bar is a necessary consideration, it is not the only
consideration." Qualhy Foods, 711 F.2d at 1000. The court will most likely exercise its discretion not to hear the pendent
claims once the federal law claim providing jurisdiction is dismissed. The Court in United Mine workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 727 (1966), stressed the importance of other factors and the basis for exercising the discretion over pendent
claims:
The question of power will ordinarily be resolved on the pleadings. But the issue whether pendent jurisdiction
has been properly assumed is one which remains open throughout the litigation. Pretrial procedures or even the
trial itself may reveal a substantial hegemony of state law claims, or likelihood of jury confusion, which could
not have been anticipated at the pleading stage. Although it will of course be appropriate to take account in this
circumstance of the already completed course of the litigation, dismissal of the state claim might even then be
merited. For example, it may appear that the plaintiff was well aware of the nature of his proofs and the relative
importance of his claims; recognition of a federal court's wide latitude to decide ancillary questions of state law
does not imply that it must tolerate a litigant's effort to impose upon it what is in effect only a state case. Once
it appears that a state claim constitutes the real body of a case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage,
the state claim may fairly be dismissed.
Besides the possible time bar from statutes of limitations, the plaintiff might argue that a dismissal of pendent claims
is an abuse of discretion because of lengthy pretrial proceedings that have occurred in the federal court. Danner v.
Himmelfarb, 858 F.2d 515, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1988). In Danner, the plaintiff claimed an abuse of discretion in dismissing
the claims "after 31/2 years of discovery and pretrial wrangling" because he was then "forced to refile his action in
California state court" and he feared it would be several years before his claims would be set for trial. Id. The court held
that the fairness concern sometimes present when dismissed claims are time-barred is likely not to be present when the
plaintiff "simply asserts that it is inconvenient for him to have to refile in state court" in light of the other pendent
jurisdiction factors. Id. The passage of time, even when resulting in the state law claims being time-barred, might not be
a weighty enough consideration to warrant the district court's retaining jurisdiction as it is "by no means determinative."
Id.
172. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 622 (1988).
173. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (factors courts should consider); In re Romulus Community
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to adjudicate pendent claims under its removal jurisdiction than under its original
jurisdiction: "A plaintiff should not be permitted to jockey the defendant back and
forth between state and federal courts by deleting her federal law claims and moving
for remand at strategic moments."1 74 Moreover, the capability of the plaintiff to
argue for remand rather than dismissal will be unlikely to modify to any notable
extent the manipulative incentives to plaintiffs whose claims are not time-barred. 7 5
As an additional disincentive, the broad joinder provisions of parties and claims
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 76 create a potential for serious problems
arising from possible res judicata effects. 177 Dismissing a federal claim simply to
manipulate the forum may mean that the federal claim is forever barred; as a result,
such manipulation is impliedly discouraged. Furthermore, Rule 11178 sanctions may
be available against a plaintiff's attorney for pleadings, motions, or other papers
interposed for any improper purpose, "such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.' 79
To make a dismissal of the federal claims more equitable, the court might
require the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs, expenses, or attorney fees. 180 These
penalties would act as another restraint on the plaintiff in attempting to manipulate the
forum. In cases of extreme and obvious orchestration, the plaintiff may be required
to agree that he will not assert his federal claims in a later action. '81 However, res
judicata would prevent the relitigation of the deleted federal claim notwithstanding
this agreement if the federal claim is in reality the same cause of action against the
same defendant as one of the state claims. 182 If the federal claim is against different
Schools, 729 F.2d 431, 440 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Determining when such dilatory tactics have occurred and when the effects
of such tactics outweigh considerations of comity, is best left to the sound discretion of the district court.").
174. Comment, supra note 31, at 622. See also Westmoreland Hosp. Ass'n v. Blue Cross, 605 F.2d 119, 123 (3d
Cir. 1979) ("[a] subsequent amendment to the complaint after removal designed to eliminate the federal claim will not
defeat federal jurisdiction"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1077 (1980); In re Greyhound Lines, Inc., 598 F.2d 883, 884 & n.I
(5th Cir. 1979) ("plaintiff cannot precipitate a remand of the action by amending complaint to eliminate federal claim,"
particularly when plaintiff's dismissals are made voluntarily for tactical reasons).
175. Steinman, supra note 37, at 974. "Through either device those plaintiffs can subject defendants to whatever
duplication and cost or disfavor may be entailed in going back to state court." Id.
176. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) (joinder of all claims one party has against an opposing party), 20(a) (plaintiffs
may join several defendants orjoin with others as multiple plaintiffs), 13(a)-(b) (counterclaims against opposing parties),
13(g) (cross-claims), 13(h) (joinder of additional parties to cross-claims and counterclaims), 14 (impleader), 22
(interpleader), and 24 (intervention).
177. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
178. FED. R. Cirv. P. 11.
179. The removal procedure under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1982), as amended by the Judicial Improvements and Access
to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4669-70 (1988), now explicitly requires that the "notice
of removal" (previously called the "petition") be signed in accordance with Rule 11 and that the notice contain "a short
and plain statement of the grounds for removal."
180. Note, supra note 90, at 210. This note suggested through an analogy to voluntary dismissals under FED. R. Ctv.
P. 41(a)(2) that this is also fair to plaintiff because it is plaintiff's option whether or not he wants to accept the conditions
that the court places on his amendment deleting the federal claims. Id. at 210-11. An analogy to the new § 1447(c) can
also be made, which states that "laln order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses,
including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal." Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988).
181. Note, supra note 90, at 211. See, e.g., Philadelphia Gear Works v. Kerotest Mfg. Co., 101 F. Supp. 820
(W.D. Pa. 1951) (motion of plaintiff to dismiss patent infringement suit, which was in its preliminary stages, granted on
condition that plaintiff would not again assert a claim against defendant for infringement).
182. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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parties who were brought into the case with pendent party jurisdiction or is simply a
different cause of action than any of the state law claims, this forbearance may be
necessary since res judicata would unlikely bar reinitiation of the federal claim.
In Cohill, after defendants removed, extensive discovery occurred over a six
month period and was prolonged several times at plaintiffs' request. 183 Only then did
plaintiffs discover that their federal law claim was not tenable and subsequently
moved to remand the case. Defendants intimated that the amendment was sought
because the case was ripe for summary judgment or trial, and that plaintiffs wanted
to delay immediate disposition of the state law claims to increase their chances for an
advantageous settlement. 184 However, plaintiffs may have legitimately discovered a
valid reason for deleting the federal law claim during discovery. 185 If so, plaintiffs
needed to eliminate this claim of dubious merit: "To do otherwise would be to force
plaintiff to litigate a federal claim which he now does not wish to litigate (and, of
course, require defendant to defend a claim which plaintiff chooses not to
pursue)."' 186 In any event, the district judge in making his decision to remand,
dismiss, or retain jurisdiction over pendent claims can take any manipulation into
account.
The commotion over forum manipulation might not be very significant once the
plaintiff decides that he is willing to give up his federal question. The expenditures
of time and resources by courts and litigants as a result of the jockeying back and
forth from federal and state courts are likely to be relatively small. 187 Additionally,
the federal court will not have a legitimate interest in preventing the jockeying since
a federal claim that belongs in federal court is no longer present. 188
183. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 6,
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988) (No. 86-1021). The petition stated:
Following its removal, this case was actively litigated. An answer was filed. [Defendants] took the depositions
of the Boyles. They also served and obtained responses to extensive requests for production of documents,
deposed William Boyle's physician, and reviewed his medical records. [Defendants] responded to the Boyles'
extensive document production requests and permitted them to review a significant amount of C-MU
[Carnegie-Mellon University] documents pursuant to those requests.
Id.
184. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1046, 1051 (3d Cir. 1986); Carnegie-
Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 623 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) (plaintiffs' counsel explained that his principal
reason for seeking the remand was to avoid a prompt trial on the state claims; the opportunities for extracting a favorable
settlement from defendants would be greater if the case were remanded because the state court dockets were considerably
more congested than the federal court dockets).
185. Cohill, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1047. In discovery, it was disclosed that plaintiff William Boyle had never
filed any age discrimination charge with a federal or state agency, a prerequisite for suit under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d), 633(b) (1982).
The issue of whether plaintiff has engaged in manipulative tactics in deciding to delete his federal claim should be
within the sound discretion of the trial court. A voluntary dismissal may be the result of discovery, new decisions, further
research, and other considerations which destroy or minimize any facial inference of manipulation. Amicus Curiae Brief
of the Dep't of Water and Power of Los Angeles at 20 n.4, Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988) (No.
86-1021).
186. Austwick v. Board of Educ., 555 F. Supp. 840, 842 (N.D. 111. 1983).
187. Steinman, supra note 37, at 966.
188. Id.
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V. LACK OF SIGNIFICANT DISTINCTION BETWEEN REMAND
AND DISMISSAL OF PENDENT CLAIMS
Besides the benefits of pendent claim remand, remand of removed claims is the
same thing as dismissal without prejudice with respect to any federal interest.1 89
'[C]rucial distinctions"190 between dispositions by remand and dismissal do not
exist. While the issue of whether to remand or dismiss affects the application of
statutes of limitations, 191 dismissal severely harms plaintiffs because it allows
defendants to escape liability from properly filed claims by means of an inequitable
legal mechanism. The issue of whether to remand or dismiss also may affect the
reviewability of the court's order. 192 Orders remanding pendent claims are, nonethe-
less, reviewable on appeal, 193 as are orders to dismiss claims.194 Even though the
issue affects the priority of the case upon its return to state court,195 concern over
priority is not enough to warrant precluding the courts from remanding pendent
claims.
Plaintiffs may be encouraged to bring cases with claims arising under both
federal and state law in state court since their state law claims are less likely to be
time-barred,196 but the case can easily be removed to federal court and the pendent
claims adjudicated there. Besides, any time bar advantage gained from starting in
state court-with the availability of the power to remand pendent claims in federal
court-would occur only if defendants remove, plaintiffs decide to delete their
federal claims, the pendent state law claims then are precluded from being refiled
189. Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 89 n.4 (4th Cir. 1983).
190. Cook v. Weber, 698 F.2d 907, 908 (7th Cir. 1983).
191. Id. See supra text accompanying note 134.
192. Cook, 698 F.2d at 908.
193. "[O]nly remand orders issued under § 1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified therein-that removal was
improvident and without jurisdiction-are immune from review under § 1447(d)." Thermntron Prods., Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 346 (1976). Because pendent claim remand is not based on § 1447(c), orders remanding
such claims are not immune from review under § 1447(d), which provides: "An order remanding a case to the State court
from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise .... ." See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying
text. See also Hewlett v. Davis, 844 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1988) (in this case decided after Cohill and which discusses
Thermtron, the court stated that an order remanding plaintiff's motion to mold the verdict could be reviewed because the
remand was on grounds not authorized by § 1447(c)). But see Steinman, supra note 37, at 991-1011 (reviewability of
remand orders of pendent claims unclear, and possibly anomalous with the appellate review of other dispositions of
claims).
Because the 1988 amendment to § 1447(c) merely divided the "improvident" and "without jurisdiction" elements
in order to provide for waiver of defects in removal procedure if not raised in a timely manner, see supra note 53 and
accompanying text, it is unlikely that the new provision affects the reviewability of the remand order under these prior
precedents interpreting old § 1447(c). The legislative history of the amendment specifically exempts pendent claim
remand from coverage under § 1447(c). See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Thus, the Thermitron quote above has
been affirmed such that § 1447(d) does not preclude review of remand orders of pendent claims since the remands are not
based on § 1447(c).
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) provides in part: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts of the United States ... except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court."
195. Cook, 698 F.2d at 908.
196. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 625 (1988) (White, J., dissenting). Because a pendent claim
brought initially in federal court can only be adjudicated or dismissed, dismissal of the claim after the statute of limitations
has run would bar the plaintiff from refiling, absent a state saving clause. However, a pendent claim brought in state court
and then removed to federal court can be protected from the time bar by remanding it to state court.
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because of statutes of limitations, and the federal court decides not to retain
jurisdiction over them. 197
While defendants might be discouraged from removing the case if they cannot
afford the round trip to federal court and back, 198 a round trip will occur only if the
federal forum is unsuitable for the pendent claims. The costs and hassles of removal
have been further decreased because Congress recently abolished the bond require-
ment of 28 U.S.C. section 1446(d). 199 Moreover, defendants have no right to have
such claims heard in federal court, 200 and resulting stratagems by plaintiffs always
will be speculative when defendants decide whether to remove. 201 Any harmful
manipulation can be taken into account in determining whether to remand or
dismiss. 20 2 Remand might even be less costly and time-consuming than dismissal,
since the state court would not have to process a new case.20 3 Furthermore, the means
of preventing impairment of state courts might be different in the removal and remand
situation, as compared with the exercise of the dismissal option, because of the
"prejudice inherent in delaying and complicating procedurally the state court's
exercise of jurisdiction by requiring the reinitiation of already commenced litigation
rather than permitting the prudential return of the previously exercised jurisdiction by
remand.' '204
The presence of an option to remand pendent claims may exacerbate existing
difficulties by not deterring, and conceivably causing, the inclusion of carelessly
considered federal law claims in state court complaints. Plaintiffs may realize that
once a case is removed, they can drop their federal claim and seek a remand, being
reasonably confident that the remand will be granted because the state law claims will
197. Steinman, supra note 37, at 974. Steinman states: "[Alnd plaintiffs later decide to dismiss their federal claims,
and those claims would be time barred on refiling .. " Steinman probably meant to say that the state law claims, and
not the federal claims, would be time-barred.
198. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. at 625.
199. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988).
The bond requirement was a surety conditioned that the defendants would pay all costs and disbursements incurred by
reason of the removal proceedings if it were determined that the case was not removable or improperly removed. While
the surety would generally not have had to pay the bond in the pendent claim remand situation since removal in such cases
is neither without jurisdiction nor improper, the defendant would still have had to obtain the bond in order to remove the
case. Congress was concerned that the bond requirement imposed a cost that might be "'substantial to some litigants, and
constitute[d] an additional procedural complication. A bond is not required on filing an action, and should not be required
on removal." H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1988). Congress stated that the new section 1447(c) "will
ensure that a substantive basis exists for requiring payment of actual expenses incurred in resisting an improper removal;
civil rule 11 can be used to impose a more severe sanction when appropriate." Id.
200. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
201. Steinman, supra note 37, at 974.
202. See supra notes 172-88 and accompanying text.
203. The dissent in Cohill disagreed with this argument. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. at 625 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
204. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Dep't of Water and Power of Los Angeles at 21-22, Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988) (No. 86-1021). The Department continued:
In light of the fact that but for the removal the impairment would not have occurred, once the basis for the
removal has disappeared, or the court notes the character of the pendent state claims to be such that abstention
is required, the action to be taken should be to remand the matter to state court which was originally ousted of
jurisdiction thereby to avoid determining or delaying the determination of an issue more properly handled by that
court.
Id. at 22.
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inevitably predominate after deletion of the federal law claims. 20 5 But the wasteful-
ness of needless removal and remand proceedings resulting from these insubstantial
claims is similar to the wasted litigation costs that occur whenever frivolous claims
are initiated. These federal claims are also subject to the guillotine of dismissal in
state court if they are deemed to be insubstantial, so removal of the case can be easily
prevented. In any event, the same incentive to include carelessly considered federal
law claims is created whether or not the district courts are allowed to remand pendent
claims. The Cohill dissent argued that if the state law claims following removal are
dismissed without prejudice from federal court, the plaintiff can simply reintroduce
the pendent claims in state court. To prevent these claims from being time-barred, the
dissent would encourage the adoption of state saving clauses. Thus, plaintiffs would
have the same predilection to bring tenuous federal law claims under both schemes,
because time bars on the state law claims would always be ineffective.
Since no vital difference exists between remand and dismissal of pendent claims,
district courts should be free to choose either in dealing with pendent claims to best
serve the policies of pendent jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The discretion to remand pendent claims might seem unnecessary since courts
currently can dismiss such claims and no "crucial distinctions" exist between remand
and dismissal. This ability may also appear to be an unauthorized usurpation of power
by the district courts which should not be condoned. However, the unfair application
of statutes of limitations on pendent claims and the dismissal predicaments in which
courts become entangled are reason enough to justify the doctrine of pendent claim
remand. 20 6 Federal courts now have a broader scope of action in order to ensure
judicial economy and fairness to litigants. In light of the Gibbs pendent jurisdiction
rationale, the majority in Cohill is not afraid to provide the courts with the necessary
remand power and discretion. Why leave it up to the states to independently elucidate
and rectify the problems of pendent claim dismissal and federal court retention-with
saving clauses, filing fee waivers, and docket priority modifications2 07-when the
authority to remand is easily accorded to the district courts? Moreover, the
"discovery" of pendent claim remand can hardly be deemed an usurpation of
congressional authority when Congress itself in the legislative history of the 1988
amendments to the removal provisions approved of this extra-statutory ability to
remand. 20 8 Discretion to remand makes common sense: it can be quite beneficial, it
205. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 16,
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988) (No. 86-1021).
206. "A system of procedure is perverted from its proper function when it multiplies impediments to justice without
the warrant of clear necessity." Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 209 (1932) (Cardozo, J., joined by Brandeis and Stona,
JJ., dissenting).
207. Steinman, supra note 37, at 972.
208. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Pendent claim remand might be attacked as violative of the
Constitution even though Congress has approved of the procedure, but that is unlikely since Congress has plenary
authority to regulate practice and procedure in the federal courts and its acceptance of the Supreme Court's decision in
Cohill can be seen as an exercise of that authority.
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produces no significant adverse effects, and it does not engender any meaningful
controversy. So why not remand?
As a further safeguard, the Gibbs considerations which the district courts are to
consider in determining whether to retain jurisdiction over pendent claims-judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-are not "amorphous" considerations
but have real bite. In Hewlett v. Davis,209 a recent case decided after Cohill, the Third
Circuit reversed a remand to state court of the plaintiff's motion to mold the verdict
following a jury verdict favorable to defendant. 21 0 The court found no indication that
the remand was prompted by any of the Gibbs factors.2 1' It also noted that when the
district court has conducted a full trial and has before it all the evidence on both the
federal and pendent claims, the Gibbs considerations "counsel retention of any
pendent claims requiring further proceedings." 21 2 The appellate courts are willing to
examine closely whether or not the pendent jurisdiction factors are present when the
district courts remand claims; they have previously done so when the district courts
decided whether to dismiss or retain jurisdiction over pendent claims. Therefore, the
assailable and illogical arguments against the beneficial and harmless power to
remand are made even more tenuous.
Varying interpretations of the pendent jurisdiction factors with conflicting court
determinations on whether to remand pendent claims are indeed possible. For
example, the Third Circuit recently stated that "time already invested in litigating the
state cause of action is an insufficient reason to sustain the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction. ' 21 3 The length of time spent on a state claim, varying from "time
invested" to a full trial, is likely to affect the decision of the court whether to retain
jurisdiction over the pendent claims or to remand them. Attempting to determine with
any consistency the importance of the time factor in each particular case would be
arduous if not impossible.2 14 The discretionary decisions of the district courts in
determining whether to remand, dismiss, or retain jurisdiction over pendent claims-
which may involve many other possible issues of comity, fairness, judicial economy,
and convenience-will be often inconsistent and fairly mysterious. However, this
concern is nothing new and it arises whenever courts are given discretionary power.
Like other discretionary decisions, ascertaining how to administer pendent claims is
challenging and requires a judgment call. The erratic and discrepant nature of such
decisions must be accepted, unless obviously wrong.2 15 Otherwise, resolutions would
209. 844 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1988).
210. Id. at 111-12. The motion alleged inter alia that the jury was presented only with the federal civil rights claim
and not the pendent state law agency claim.
211. Id. at 116.
212. Id.
213. Lovell Mfg. v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, 843 F.2d 725, 735 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Weaver
v. Marine Bank, 683 F.2d 744, 746 (3d Cir. 1982)).
214. See Danner v. Himmelfarb, 858 F.2d 515,524 (9th Cir. 1988), in which the Court of Appeals stated that prior
cases "do not hold that the district court must exercise jurisdiction over pendent state claims whenever there have been
lengthy pretrial proceedings. The decision to exercise jurisdiction is discretionary." Moreover, an abuse of discretion will
only arise when the court of appeals is "left with 'a firm and definite conviction that the court below committed a clear
error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.' " Id. at 525 (quoting United States
v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1577 (9th Cir. 1988)).
215. See, e.g., Hewlett v. Davis, 844 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1988) (besides the lack of any consideration of the
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never be reached since often no clear answer exists and strict guidelines to force
congruous outcomes are inconceivable.
Another difficulty with the Court's decision in Cohill relates to the ramifications
of Thermtron2t 6 and the potential danger that the Court in Cohill opened a Pandora's
Box.217 Instead of the majority's reading of Thermtron as merely precluding remands
for reasons that would not support a dismissal without prejudice, 21 8 another
interpretation perceives the focus of Thermtron to be that the remand was improper
because the judge had remanded on grounds not authorized by 28 U.S.C. section
1447(c). 21 9 Pendent claim remand therefore should be prohibited: it is not authorized
by section 1447(c) since the removal was not improvident or without jurisdiction.220
Simply because a particular case can be dismissed without prejudice is not enough to
allow its remand.
By allowing the remand of pendent claims through an interpretation of Thermtron
as prohibiting remands of claims that would not support dismissals of such claims, the
Supreme Court may be opening the door for the district courts to remand for other
extra-statutory reasons since a whole range of doctrines permit federal courts to dismiss
cases without prejudice. 221 These reasons include nonjusticiability, mootness, and
abstention. 222 In McIntyre v. Fallahay,223 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
determined that the district courts do not have discretion to remand claims to state
courts on grounds of nonjusticiability or mootness, and that the courts could remand
only if the removal was improvident or without jurisdiction. 224 While this pre-Cohill
case did not permit the extra-statutory remand, the district courts may see the Supreme
Court's decision in Cohill as providing remand authority in other cases.
For example, in Corcoran v. Ardra Insurance Co. ,225 a case decided in light of
Cohill, the Second Circuit approved the district court's remand of a case on
abstention grounds since the court had power to dismiss the action on those grounds.
Rather than dismissing the action, the district court remanded it, thereby accommo-
dating the "values of economy, convenience, and comity, and avoiding the delay
involved in dismissing the federal litigation and requiring the parties to start
anew.' '226 It applied the Thermtron interpretation of the Cohill majority and found
that such remand authority is not required to be statutorily defined.
Gibbs factors and the already conducted full trial, the Court of Appeals determined that the refusal to retain pendent
jurisdiction over the claims was improper in light of the district court's equivocally remanding "in an abundance of
caution").
216. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
217. Steinman, supra note 37, at 954-55.
218. See supra notes 96-119 and accompanying text.
219. Steinman, supra note 37, at 953-54.
220. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
221. Steinman, supra note 37, at 954-55.
222. Id. at 955.
223. 766 F.2d 1078 (7th Cir. 1985).
224. Id. at 1082.
225. 842 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1988).
226. Id. The court also quoted Naylor v. Case & McGrath, Inc., 585 F.2d 557, 565 (2d Cir. 1978), which stated:
"[Albstention can be exercised through remand, assuring an adjudication of the state law issues in the pending action
without risk of delay."
[Vol. 50:767
PENDENT CLAIM REMAND
These prudential grounds for dismissal are distinguishable from pendent claim
remand. Since Congress has left the development of the pendent jurisdiction doctrine
to the courts227 and has not attempted to provide statutorily for general pendent
jurisdiction, even though such jurisdiction is suitable for statutory provisions as an
ingredient of subject matter jurisdiction, the remand statutes and Thermtron should
not be viewed as precluding the ability to remand pendent claims. However, the
prudential doctrines of abstention and the like are true judicially imposed precepts.
Congress has not left their evolution to the courts since Congress realistically has no
power over these doctrines: they are not generally suitable for statutory delineation.
Perhaps the remand statutes of the Judicial Code should be understood to apply to all
cases other than pendent claims and, as a result, to preclude inherently the remand of
properly removed cases based on these prudential doctrines.
The Supreme Court has "left the lower federal courts with little guidance as to
how to make the choice between dismissal and remand in contexts outside of pendent
jurisdiction problems." 228 Applying the Cohill principle to other areas may be seen
as a severe imposition on the separation of powers and the statutory authority of
Congress to provide for removal and remand, even though Congress has expressly
sanctioned pendent claim remand. 229 Through the Cohill decision, the Supreme Court
itself probably intends to limit its holding and to allow for extra-statutory remand only
for pendent claims; thus, Cohill should not be hastily read by the district courts to
warrant the remand of cases on other grounds not defined by the remand statutes.
Nevertheless, if courts do apply Cohill to other areas, the usurpation of
congressional power will be insignificant. Remand is not truly any different from
dismissal. The remand of cases and claims is generally more beneficial and efficient
than dismissal. The remand statutes should not be read to preclude the remand of
cases not identified in the statutes, since those statutes do not provide an exclusive list
of circumstances when district court judges can remand. 230 In addition, Congress
itself approved extra-statutory remands when it approved pendent claim remand. In
any event, courts deciding to remand for other reasons can consider whether the
purposes of the statutory removal and remand provisions are furthered or thwarted by
the creation of nonstatutory remand authority in the particular case, with ultimate
review of their determinations by the Supreme Court and Congress.
Dean M. Lenzotti
227. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
228. Steinman, supra note 37, at 957.
229. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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